1. Contents of Consciousness

Contents of consciousness, such as pain, pleasure, anxiety or 'self-awareness', can be linked to neurophysiological processes but the latter can only be 'observed' and described in an 'observer oriented language'. The former, however, are experiences of the internal states of an organism by the organism itself. Colour can be experienced by many organisms to some extent, while guesses can be made about the 'qualities' of the private experiences of others. But the experiences themselves (not their observable aspects) can only be expressed in an 'ego oriented' language. This is obviously the case when these contents of consciousness are exclusive experiences –through internal detectors – of an organism about its internal states. It is contradictory to say that the experience by an organism of its internal states could be had by another organism. How can my typical heart 'angor' be experienced by another person? I can say to myself, "Yesterday, at 10.30 AM, I had this type of feeling". But even the best cardiologist cannot imagine how exactly I felt, let alone feeling that himself. It is obvious that this type of experiences can never be formulated in an 'observer language' characteristic of the natural and social sciences.

1.1. Lack of insight into this inherent property of these types of experiences inclines some people to think that the 'observer approach' is about common 'material things', whereas the 'ego approach' refers to entities of another type. But there is no reason to think that the processes within an organism experienced through its internal detectors are less material than those accessible to external observation. Many discussions about the 'mind-body-problem' suffer from the absence of this elementary distinction between these two types of languages and their mutual untranslatability. Some think that 'subjective' manipulations cannot be realized in material systems; how do they know this? This basic 'insight' seems to  depend on the 'principle of non-distinction of the distinct' viz. the distinction between 'observer language' and 'ego language' and the impossibility of translation between them, whether the systems are material or not.

1.2. Even if a complete human-like robot could be constructed, whose humanity could be proved by an extended Turing test, all we could say is that it has emotions and consciousness like us. But that would not enable us to know how it 'feels', any more than we can know that of another person. I repeat: the inner experiences of a person, whether biological or man-made, are experiences accessible only to herself. Of course, we believe that only human beings and some animals appear capable of experiencing internal states and we cannot prove in detail that they are strictly material systems. We have to wait until completely material man-made robots tell us that they have such experiences. Denying that they are full-fledged persons would lead us to negate the existence of their 'other minds' and that amounts to extreme solipsism or anti-machine racism. In this sense, the solution to Chalmers' problem sounds somewhat like the answer to: "how does life function in a dead organism?"

2. A Novel Theory

Before taking up the other two theses, I propose a rather novel theory that might make further discussions more convincing.

2.1.1. First, some basics about my world view. (a) In the whole universe, next to space/time, there is only E/M: things with mass or energy as referred to in Einstein's equation (E =Mc². (b) E/M can be measured variously by a variety of instruments. The differences lie in the different 'states' of E/M substrates. (c) Human knowledge cannot describe all particular states; it refers mostly to sets (classes) of states, sets of sets, etc. Without such a hierarchy of sets, our  world would be a chaos and useful actions would be impossible. (d) To introduce organisation into this chaos, we use what I call I-systems (information processing systems). The sim- plest type has an entry which can detect different states (the input) of an E/M-substrate (e.g. different sound waves) and an exit which can exhibit different states (the output) of an EM-substrate (different light waves). The essential property of a simple I-system is that it systematically realizes a one-to-one correspondence between sets of input states and sets of output states.

2.1.2. We can generalize this elementary idea. Every system that systematically realizes an isomorphism between subsets of states of the input and subsets of states of the output is an I-system. One can also say that such a system identifies ('considers' as equivalent) these subsets of states of the input and discriminates them from other subsets of states.

2.1.3. The basic definition of this article is the following: a set of states of an E/M substrate that is identified and discriminated from other sets of states is a *form. Generally speaking, (to be qualified later) such discrimination and identification is realized by an I-system.

Where this definition is meant, a star * is added to the term 'form'. Further: (i) When there is isomorphism between the *forms of input and output, some E/M manipulation ('transformation') on the substrates is implied in most cases. (*Forms of sound waves may be mapped onto *forms of electric current etc.) (ii) *Forms can travel from one I-system to another, since output *forms of the first can be input *forms for the second. etc. (iii) I-systems can contain internal I-systems, whose existence can be deduced from its overt behaviour. (iv) Using different identification and discrimination criteria, the input of an I-system can identify  different types of *forms, (v) Subsystems of a total system are mostly interlinked in different ways.

2.1.4. Here is the basic postulate of this '*form theory': notions like 'form', 'shape', 'figure', 'configuration', 'type', 'structure', 'design', 'melody', 'fragrance', 'meme' etc. can be defined as a '*form'. More importantly, whatever is called 'a signal', 'a sign', 'a message', ' a stimulus' and especially a unit of 'information', an item of 'perception' or a piece of 'knowledge', can be rigorously defined as a *form.

2.1.5. The case of 'information' is rather special, since this is the first real, physically de- scribed and consistently applicable definition of the term. (Compare in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for instance: "information": 767 entries, "information AND definition": 456 entries, "information AND concept": 541 entries.)

2.1.6. It follows that there are no *forms without EM-substrates and I-systems to identify sets of states of them. There is one important exception, though.

2.2.1. One of the most remarkable, perhaps the most remarkable event in the history of the universe, is the fact that *forms detected by I-systems in the 20th century did in fact emerge more than three billion years ago as sets of states of an E/M substrate that could generate other sets of states of an E/M substrate with which they were isomorphic. These, in turn, produce equally isomorphic sets of states. In other words, *forms become capable of replicating themselves without the interference of an I-system or any other external system.

They are not only *forms for us but also *forms in their own right. This event, of course was the origin of life. But since DNA chains are rather well known, I will focus on the special role of the different types of phenotypic *forms in this development.

2.2.2. Suppose that, somewhere in the Cambrian sea, there is a worm-like animal - a tube with two openings through which water with nutrients can flow in and out. Suppose further that it can sexually reproduce. When the distribution of the density of nutrients is not homogeneous, Variation and Selection (VS) will favour the development of locomotion to increase the probability of contact with nutrients. But a random movement uses a lot of energy. VS will thus also favour the development of detection systems to locate nutrients. Say that these are characterized by degrees of acidity. If a chemical detector of a ph-*form initiates and directs its locomotion system to the nutrients, our tube has an I-system. Other types of sensors could also emerge: tactile, sound, light, etc. Their usefulness depends on the existence of a non-homogeneous distribution of M/E substrates: a subset (a *form) of these is typical for the nutrient of our tube. Since the detection of *forms saves energy, VS will cause our tube to develop a wide range of complex I-systems to detect *forms of smell, taste, touch, sound, light etc. Those familiar with ethology will recognize that its 'releasers' are *forms of input and that its "innate motor patterns" are *forms of output. The "innate releasing mechanism" is the E/M transformation mechanism which realises the isomorphism. Many such I-systems studied by ethologists are innate, but it is clear that VS will tend to develop systems capable of learning: activities essential for survival are made adaptable to different situations.

Throughout the animal world, the basic needs and activities related to survival have to do with a search for nutrients, avoidance of danger (predators or poison) and mating. In the 'struggle for life' concerning these needs, there can be no question about the advantage of the existence of a wide variety of efficient I-systems. When environments are variable and complex, this is even more the case. At some levels, the innate input-output links might no longer be efficient. Then, through feedback loops, VS will tend to introduce and link a variety of input *forms to more variable output *forms. This could happen through the linking of sets of neural complexes (sets of internal *forms) to different input *forms. Even the whole set of *forms of visual inputs could be isomorphic with the set of 'visual' neural *forms. That would bring about a kind of internal neural model of the visual world of the animal. Similar subsystems could be developed for auditory, olfactory, tactile inputs.

 The advantage of such internal sets of *forms is obvious when the input *forms become unreliable because of darkness, noise, etc. It is self-evident that, in primitive stages, these internal 'models' are not detailed 'representations'; the *forms detect only aspects of the en- vironment relevant to the basic needs and activities mentioned above. These internal models should also be linked to the diverse output *forms (directing movements; sending warning signals). An even greater advantage is achieved when these models have feedback loops; the auditory *form of a roar could evoke a response in the neural (visual) *form of the lion. I cannot expatiate here on the possible extensions of the identification capacities of an ever growing inter-linked I-system. A more detailed and coherent general picture of the Umwelt might emerge. Equally, the organism as a whole would be tightly unified, whose adaptive value is evident: a coordination of activities that guarantee the fulfilment of basic needs (food, mating, danger) is essential for survival.

2.2.3. I must emphasize that the theoretical distinction between the different types of I- systems, and their external and internal inputs and outputs, including the links between them, does not imply that they can always be observed within the nervous system as clearly distinct components. These 'functional units' may result from the interaction of neuron complexes in different parts of the brain. A visual or auditory I-system refer to *forms as I define them. Thus, the E/M basis remains essential and they explain how a chaotic whole can control our actions.

2.2.4. To my astonishment, however, in many general textbooks on biology, one extremely important subsystem is rarely mentioned. A link between, say, the visual system and the motor system is useless, if there is no system capable of mobilizing, intensifying, inhibiting these and other systems and, when required, switching from one system to another.

When an animal is saturated with food, its I-systems should be used for mating rather than eating. If it detects a *form linked to danger while eating or mating, surely, the escape (or aggression) behaviour should be compulsorily mobilized. There is no point to eating or mating if you die before the aim is attained.

To regulate the interaction of the different needs (or drives), a special I-system is needed. That is the E-system (emotional) which manages the hierarchy of types of behaviour. It coordinates all important subsystems to produce the type of required behaviour in that situation. When the hunger drive is at rest, mating can play a central role; but when a danger *form I is detected, the animal as a whole has to produce the appropriate response. Complex animals can survive only when they are totally engaged in the most appropriate activity at any given moment.

2.2.5. As all other *forms, these coordinated *forms are also identified sets of states of E/M substrates. But it is remarkable that what human beings call feelings or emotions (hunger, thirst, eating and sexual pleasure, disgust, pain, fear, anger…) occur in behaviour situations connected to the basic needs of animals in general. They not only occur in the same situations but, in many cases, they also have the same effect. The burning of the skin, which is a nociceptive stimulus for an animal and a pain stimulus for us, leads to the same reaction. The *form of a tiger causes escape behaviour in animals and human beings; sometimes this is accompanied with what we interpret as signs of 'anxiety'. 

Of course, the degree of complexity of the subsystems of different animals varies. So does the degree of integration of their various subsystems. But I submit that the E-system contributes to the increasing unification and coordination of the activities of the whole system. My thesis is that the more the whole organism reacts as a unit ('pleasure' of eating, 'lust' of 'mating', 'anxiety' of fleeing), the more does this unity bring about a specific state, which is the most primitive form what we call 'emotions'. What I would call PC1…PC3…PCn types of consciousness are in reality degrees of coherence and coordination in some or in many situations. To what degree this unification is also experienced by the animal as a state of itself is difficult to know. Anyhow, next to the visual, auditory, etc. models of animals, human beings also have a model of *forms where our linguistic capabilities function. It is complex, but it consists nevertheless of sets of sets of *forms linked to the other systems including the E-system. Within that linguistic model, thanks to the properties of our languages, metareflections are possible. Hence there is something special to human consciousness. The awareness of the unity of the organism is considerably enhanced, including its past and future. This may lead to a more intense form of emotions and consciousness. But the very fact that we can refer to the development and intensification of a number of linked characteristics in the course of evolution, seems to make the hypothesis of pre-human states of pre-consciousness, PC1, PC2… PC9 rather plausible. The idea that a special soul is needed to become human beings is obsolete. Why would such an unintelligible leap be necessary in the case of emotions and consciousness?

3. Emotions and I-Awareness

Full-fledged emotions and accompanying general moods are typical for human beings and, as I explained above, we will never be able to have contact with their inner direct I- awareness. The same problem exists in an even more intense way as far as animals are con- cerned. But, since there can be no doubt about the causal survival value of the E-system in animals, there is no reason to consider its function in human beings as an epiphenomenon.