1. Introduction

At present there is no agreed upon definition of consciousness--Vimal (2009) identified over forty!--so how could we discuss it in the same breath as the scientific field of quantum physics? A recent issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies devoted ten articles to the topic of defining consciousness, the editor concluding that we should all try harder to both specify what we mean when referring to "consciousness" and pay more attention to the contexts within which that meaning applies. And we should embrace the resultant diversity … . (Nunn 2009, p.7) Might a science-based discussion of consciousness and quantum physics be barking up the wrong tree? And if so, how might discussion be redeployed away from consciousness without falling into the dullness of crass materialism?

Since "consciousness" is so ill-defined, we are at the mercy of tacit subtextual meanings. Yet clues might be found in the term's etymology, which gains us a certain detachment. The very term "consciousness" already carries profound biases. It derives from the Latin con-scieri, which is to know-together, and accordingly cognitive-social. Conscientia--conscience--is an internalization of social knowing, viz. a self-knowing and judging. But today consciousness has a much broader meaning than this historical cognitive emphasis. "Consciousness" in present usage is not just a socialized knowing but is also perceptual. We say that we are conscious of the phenomenal world. The supplement to knowing found in the contemporary meaning of "consciousness" encompasses "qualia" too--the conscious experience of colors, sounds, odors, etc. --but this is precisely where there is hot debate. Despite enormous discussion (e.g. Kazniak 2001; Wright 2008) there is no philosophical consensus regarding the qualia problem. So the extension of the original cognitive meaning of "consciousness" to include qualitative experiences brings complications to any engagement with an unsuspecting physics, which ought to make us suspicious.

It should not be thought that substituting "awareness" or "experience" for "consciousness" improves the situation. "Aware" comes from an old English term meaning cautious (cf. "wary"), which is a cognitive activity. "Experience" (cf. "experiment") comes from the Latin experio, to try out, which is cognitive-behavioral. It is noteworthy that the term ‘consciousness’ does not even appear until the 17th century. If this is something so fundamental as to be related to quantum physics, why should it take so long to be distinguished in philosophical discourse? Were the philosophers of ancient Greece so unwise?

As if the ambiguity and subtext of "consciousness" were not enough, consciousness is already party to a long-standing and still highly contentious problem within quantum physics itself: the "measurement problem," which is typified by Schrӧdinger's notorious cat. Consistent with the principles of quantum physics Schrӧdinger's cat seems to be in a superposition state of being dead and being alive, until a conscious observation is made.

Even if it is supposed that consciousness has nothing to do with the outcome--supposed that the wave function readily collapses on its own (Gihradi 2007; Hameroff and Penrose 1996)--the result is not a phenomenal cat, dead or alive as the case may be. Wave function collapse is to near-certainty of location, not to a phenomenal cat. The wave function is a wave of probability and its collapse is still expressed in probabilistic terms ("exceedingly near 1.0" at some point). Any phenomenality depends on the observer's consciousness, and so the measurement problem drags in some meta-physics. Since the tradition of metaphysics runs back through Kant and Descartes to Plato--a tradition that uncommonsensical quantum physics otherwise challenges at every turn--the very topic of consciousness and quantum physics cries for deconstruction.

There is no place for the phenomenal cat in quantum physics itself--that cat right there in the box, dead or alive, after you open it. Quantum field theory is well capable of describing macroscopic objects with sharp boundary structures (Umezawa 1993, Chapter 6). Scale is not an issue for quantum field theory. (There is no need to get to the macroscopic by the fiat of letting Planck's constant go to zero.) But a macroscopic quantum object is not of the same kind as a cat-in-a-box: that would be a colossal category mistake to equate them. Might quantum brain theory ride to the rescue? Many theories have been proposed for how quantum brain mechanisms might generate consciousness and thereby rescue from metaphysics the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. (Quantum physicists in general have been slow to recognize the importance of quantum brain theory to their endeavor.) But these attempts run into the wasps nest already emphasized: the definability problem for consciousness, the qualia problem, and unyielding controversy over the measurement problem. A fresh start is tried here and the brutal consequences are faced.

2. Dis-Closure

The world presences, "is," exists, has Being, appears … . Instead of saying that we are "conscious of the world" it is less prejudicial to say that we always find ourselves already amidst one, waking and dreaming both. Being is no easy replacement for consciousness, to be sure … and the term "Being" may sound more problematic than "consciousness" to the physics ear. For reasons to be brought out, I shall use instead the term "dis-closure."

To speak of the quantum "world," as is sometimes loosely done, is self-contradictory. As already emphasized above, the quantum realm lacks phenomenality, has no appearance, is closed. What is needed is an account of the appearance of Being, presence, or since the fundamental property is closedness, what is called for is dis-closedness.

Dis-closure entails an action--an action on closure--a dis-closure in which Being--a cat in a box--appears. What is called for by the above deconstruction of consciousness in quantum physics is an account of dis-closure. Thermofield brain dynamics provides an explanation of dis-closure that may get free from the problematical consciousness.

3. Thermofield Brain Dynamics

The origins of thermofield brain dynamics go back to the quantum brain dynamics of Umezawa and coworkers in the late sixties (Umezawa 1995). It was recognized that symmetry-breaking in the ground state of the brain--the vacuum state of a water electric dipole field--offers a mechanism for memory. Sensory inputs fall into the ground after dissipating their energy and break the dipole symmetry. The broken symmetry is preserved by boson condensation (Nambu-Goldstone condensates). When the sensory input is repeated, the condensate-trace is excited from the vacuum state and becomes conscious. Jibu and Yasue (1995, 2004) worked this idea into a full-fledged quantum brain dynamics of consciousness.

Vitiello (1995, 2001, 2004) greatly extended quantum brain dynamics to a thermofield brain dynamics by bringing in dissipation. Now the brain is a dissipative system and its vacuum state has two modes: a system mode and an environment mode. The system mode contains the boson memory traces and the environment mode expresses ongoing input. ("Input" should be understood here as both sensory signals and signals the brain generates on its own, that is, other-generated signals and self-generated signals.) Neither mode exists without the other. The vacuum state is "between-two," between other-generated and self-generated signals on the one hand and memory traces on the other. Vitiello proposed that consciousness is not the quantum brain dynamics model of excitation of memory traces from the vacuum but is the state of match between dual modes. Consciousness for Vitiello is between-two.

Notable in the Vitiello model is a new version of ontological duality. The traditional dualities are the two substances of Descartes or the two aspects of a "neutral reality" proposed by Spinoza. Mitigated dualisms include Sperry's (1969) emergent level which is more than the sum of its interacting parts and Huxley's (1898) epiphenomenalism in which the mental is a nomological dangler without causal influence. The between-two is a new idea. The two are indissolubly coupled--no one without the other--and unlike ontological substances or aspects of a neutral substance, what is primary is their between.

Since Vitiello wedded thermofield brain dynamics to consciousness, the same difficulties already detailed arise. But we may alternatively reinterpret thermofield brain dynamics as a theory of dis-closure (Globus 2003, 2009). Dis-closure is between-two.

Phenomenal world appears when the dual modes belong-together, in the sense that a complex number "belongs-to" its complex conjugate. The match between such dual modes is real. Phenomenal world is a function of the brain's quantum vacuum state, dis-closed in the match between other-action, self-action and memory traces.

4. Paying the Dues for Giving-Up Consciousness

We should not expect to get off so easily after jettisoning consciousness for action-cum-disclosure. Something dear to our hearts is exploded: the world-in-common that faithful observers might by and large agree on. Not only do we lose our consciousness but we lose the world too. Now every quantum thermofield brain is dis-closing worlds in parallel. There is no world-in-common that we each represent (re-present) in our own way, nor do we each pick up a common world's sensory offerings according to our individual predilection (Gibson 1979; Neisser 1976), not even a common world that is selected by sensory input from the possibilities we variously bring to it (Edelman 1987). For the present proposal there is no physical reality of an external world, only unworldly macroscopic and microscopic quantum objects. All worlds are between-two.

So Being, which is to replace consciousness, can be precisely specified. Ontologically primary is distinctionless abground, and Being is secondarily dis-closed--appears--in virtue of an action on the abground, an action that unfolds. That is, the primary ontological condition is closure and Being requires its undoing: dis-closure. The deconstructed topic of "consciousness and quantum physics" is succeeded by the topic of "Being and quantum physics."

This view should not be confused with multiple worlds theory (Greene 2011), which just compounds the difficulties surrounding consciousness already discussed. In multiple worlds theory every possible result of wave function collapse is realized. In one world the Schrӧdinger cat is found alive by a consciousness and in another world found dead by a different consciousness. For the present account, in contrast, different observers perceive the same result. The worlds dis-closed are multiple yet in agreement. There is consensus to the extent that other-action, self-action and memory are comparable across brains.

The present view might be called "monadological" but in a distinct sense from that of Leibniz. Leibniz did not doubt that there is in fact a transcendent world bestowed through God's love. "God produces substances from nothing," Leibniz (1952, sect. 395) states in the Theodicy. The worlds in parallel of monads are in "pre-established harmony" with the transcendent world God thinks into being. But there is no transcendent world according to the view developed here. There is closure--a distinctionless "abground" (Heidegger 1999) or even "holomovement" (Bohm 1980; Bohm and Hiley 1993)--and multiple parallel phenomenal world disclosures. This is a rather scary thought, to lose the quotidian world-in-common, when you really think about it ...

Other macroscopic quantum objects besides brains also have a matching state of their between-two but the disclosures of, say, an old cabbage, barely change from moment to moment. To use the Kantian phrase, such a macroscopic quantum object "is in itself" but its Being doesn"t amount to much. The brain's genius is that the between-two comes under exquisite control by three influences: other-action, self-action and memory. Complex dis-closures flowingly evolve in waking life.

Three distinct types of brain state bring out some implications of the model. In the case of well-formed slow wave sleep, the between-two disclosure is closer to that of the cabbage. During active REM sleep, however, the between-two revives, though with the participation of other-action (sensory input) strongly inhibited. The between-two becomes a function of only residual self-actions (mainly from the preceding day, Freudian "day residues") and retraces (typically of emotional significance): the dream life is dis-closed. (See Globus (2010) for a detailed illustration of how this works.) Monadological disclosure accordingly varies dramatically in content across waking, dreaming and sleeping but in no case can be transcended. We are windowless monads in parallel and best get on with it! Such a counter-intuitive conclusion is founded in a relentless deconstruction of the role of consciousness in quantum physics. The successor concept to consciousness is "world-thrownness" in virtue of between-two dis-closure.